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Abstract- Data security has become a major issue in most 
network protocols. For wireless system, security support is 
even more important to protect the users as well as the 
network. Due to this importance, different protocol were 
designed & deployed with network standards in order to add 
the security. The security sub layer of IEEE 802.16 employs an 
authenticated client/server key management protocol in which 
the B.S, the serve, control the distribution of keying materials 
to the client M.S. This paper analyzes the physical layer threat 
& MAC layer threat of WiMAX .First give an overview of 
security architecture of mobile WiMAX network, then 
investigate different security vulnerability & gives possible 
solution to overcome them. These vulnerabilities are the 
possibilities to forge key messages in Multi- and Broadcast 
operation, some unauthenticated messages which are 
susceptible to forgery and the unencrypted management 
communication which reveal important management 
information. We modify DH key exchange protocol to fit it into 
mobile WiMAX network as well as eliminate existing weakness 
in original DH key exchange protocol. Also RSA & Elliptic 
curve Diffie Hellman key agreement algorithm are discuss 
which can be used to generate symmetric key between M.S & 
B.S. Several one way function are presented by using 
cryptography, which can be used to solve shared key 
vulnerability in Multi-&Broadcast service. We find the initial 
network procedure is not effectively secured that makes Man-
in-the-middle attacks & Denial of service attack possible. 
Keywords-IEEE 802.16e security, multi-and broadcast 
service, shared key vulnerability, Key agreement, DoS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
WiMAX- opens the door to thousands of applications that 
make use of the solid wireless backbone to connect people 
together. With the high data rate, applications will include 
voice calls, video transfer, file transfer and many other 
services. 
All those types of applications will require a secure medium 
to operate and exchange information safely. This is what the 
IEEE decided to add to the WiMAX standard in its both 
versions  mobile and fixed broadband wireless access. First 
of all security scheme of Mobile WiMAX are introduced. 
Afterwards different security threats, Vulnerabilities and 
possible solutions to solve them are presented 
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1) Wimax Security Scheme 
a) Protocol layer: 
The IEEE 802.16 standard consists of a protocol Stack with 
well-defined interfaces. The scope of Protocol contains PHY 
layer and MAC layer [1]. MAC layer consist three sub-
layers which is shown in Figure 1. The Service Specific the 
security sub-layer, Convergence Sublayer (MAC CS) and 
the MAC Common Part Sub-layer (MAC CPS). The service 
specific Convergence Sublayer (CS) maps higher level data 
services to MAC layer service flows and connections. There 
are two type of CS: packet CS which supports Ethernet, 
point-to-point protocol (PPP), both IPv4 and IPv6 internet 
protocols, and virtual 
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Figure 1: Protocol Layering in 802.16 
local area network (VLAN) and ATM CS which is designed 
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for ATM network and service [1]. MAC Common Part 
Sublayer is the core of the standard. MAC CPS defines the 
rules and mechanisms for system access, bandwidth 
allocation and connection management. Functions like 
uplink scheduling, grant, connection control and bandwidth 
request and automatic repeat request is also defined here. 
Communications between the the MAC CPS and CS are 
done by MAC Service Access Point [1]. The security sub-
layer is responsible for decryption and encryption of data 
traveling to and from the PHY layer, and it is also used for 
authentication and secure key exchange. This Sub-layer lies 
between PHY layer and MAC CPS [1]. PHY layer, targeted 
for operation in the 10-66 GHz frequency band, is designed 
with a high degree of flexibility in order to allow service 
providers to optimize system deployments with respect to 
cost, radio capabilities, cell planning and services. 
2) Security scheme 
The Mobile WiMAX system based on the IEEE 802.16e 
amendment and has more improved security features than 
previous IEEE 802.16d-based WiMAX network system [2]. 
Almost all the security issues in Mobile WiMAX are 
considered in security sub-layer and are shown in Figure 2.
 
Figure 2: Security sub-layer 
The security sub-layer encompasses three essential 
Functions: authentication, authorization and encryption [1]. 
The PKM protocol uses, strong encryption algorithm and 
RSA public key algorithm, X.509 digital certificates, to 
carry out key exchanges between BS and M.S [2]. This 
Privacy protocol has been enhanced to accommodate 
stronger cryptographic methods such as AES to fit into the 
IEEE 802.16 MAC [2]. The main objective of the privacy 
sub layer is to protect service providers against theft of 
service, rather than guarding network users. Privacy sub 
layer is above the physical layer, so it only guards data (data 
link) but does not protect physical layer from intercepted. It 
is necessary to secure the physical layer 
3) WiMAX Security Process 
  WiMAX security process is divided into three steps: 
1. Authentication 
2. Data Key exchange. 
3. Data Encryption. 
 
Figure 3: IEEE 802.16 MAC and Physical Layer 
4) Initial network entry process 
 
Initial network entry contains four processes: initial Ranging 
process, M.S Basic Capability negotiation process, PKM 
authentication process and registration process [2]. It is the 
most security sensitive processes in IEEE 802.16 [WiMAX] 
network not only because it is the first phase to establish a 
connection to the network, but also because many 
parameters, performance factors and security contexts 
between B.S and serving M.S are determined during this 
process. The initial network process is illustrated in Figure 
5. After initial network entry, the management 
communication over the primary and basic management 
connections remains unencrypted [2]. As most of the 
management messages are sent on these connections, all 
management information exchanged between B.S and M.S 
can be accessed by a adversary [2]. 
 
 
Figure 4: WiMAX initial network entry procedure 
 
The only messages which are encrypted are key transfer 
messages. But in this case only the key is encrypted, all 
other information is still sent in the clear. An intruder 
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collecting management information can create detailed 
profiles about M.S‘s including capabilities of devices, 
security settings, associations with base stations and all 
other information described above. Using the data offered in 
power reports, registration, ranging and handover messages, 
an attacker is able to determine the movement and 
approximate position of the M.S as well. Monitoring the 
MAC address sent in ranging or registration messages 
reveals the mapping of connection identifier (CID) and 
MAC address, making it possible to clearly relate the 
collected information to user equipment [2]. 
I. VULNERABILITIES IN IEEE 802.16E 
This section explains vulnerabilities found in Mobile 
WiMAX by analysis. These vulnerabilities are: 
1) Unauthenticated messages 
 
There are some unauthenticated Messages include in Mobile 
WiMAX. Their forgery can interrupt or constrict the 
communication between M.S and B.S [3]. First it has to be 
mentioned that a couple of management messages are sent 
over the broadcast management connection. Broadcasted 
management messages authentication is difficult since there 
is no common key to generate message digests. A common 
key would not completely protect the integrity of the 
message as M.S sharing the key can forge these messages 
and generate valid authentication digits [3]. 
2) Unencrypted management communications 
Management messages in Mobile WiMAX are still sent in 
the clear. The consequential risk shall be outlined in this 
section.When a M.S performs initial network entry it 
negotiates communication parameters and settings with the 
B.S [2]. Here a lot of information is exchanged like mobility 
parameters, security negotiation parameters, configuration 
settings, power settings, vendor information, MSs 
Capabilities etc. In the existing system the complete 
management message exchange in the network entry process 
is unencrypted and the above mentioned information can be 
accessed just by listening on the channel [2]. 
3) Shared keys in the multi- and broadcast service 
 
The Multi- and Broadcast service provides the possibility to 
distribute data to multiple MS with one single message. This 
saves bandwidth and cost. Broadcasted messages in IEEE 
802.16e are encrypted with a shared key [3] [2]. Every 
member in the group know the key and thus can decrypt the 
traffic. Also message authentication is also based on the 
same shared key. This algorithm contains the vulnerability 
that every group member, besides decrypting and verifying 
broadcast messages can also encrypt and authenticate 
messages as if they originated from the legitimate B.S [3]. 
Another thing which is much more problematic is the 
distribution of the traffic encryption keys (GTEKs) when the 
optional Multi- and Broadcast Rekeying Algorithm is used. 
To transfer a GTEK to all group members, it is broadcasted 
but encrypted with the group key encryption key (GKEK). 
Because of broadcasting, the GKEK must also be a shared 
key and every group member knows it [3]. An adversary 
group member can use it to generate valid encrypted and 
authenticated GTEK key update command messages and 
distribute its own GTEK. Every group member would 
establish the adversary‘s key as a valid GTEK. 
Subsequently, all traffic sent by the legitimate B.S can no 
longer be decrypted by the MS. From M.Ss point of view, 
only traffic from the adversary is valid. To establish the 
adversary‘s key (M.S), there are several possibilities. If the 
implementation does not work completely, the key from the 
latter of two subsequently sent GTEK update command 
messages may overwrite the former one [3]. Hence the 
adversary just has to send its GTEK (Group Traffic 
Encryption Key) update command message after the B.S 
broadcasted a key update message. If the implementation 
follows the standard, the keys of both messages are 
accepted. To be sure the M.S will not establish the 
legitimate B.Ss key, an adversary could forge some part of 
the B.Ss GTEK update command message. Such a changed 
message would not be verified as correct and it is discarded 
by the M.Ss [3]. After this the adversary can send its own 
GTEK update command message. Which will be accepted. 
In a unicast connection this different keying material at the 
M.S would be detected as the B.S cannot decrypt data sent 
by the M.S. These results in a TEK invalid message destined 
to the mobile station which subsequently refreshes its 
keying material. Since the MBS is unidirectional, the B.S 
unable to detect that M.S has different GTEKs. 
4) Initial network entry vulnerability 
a) RNG-RSP vulnerability 
In RNG-RSP vulnerability, the attacker modifies the 
RNGRSP message and sets the status as failed and re-sends 
it to M.S. So the M.S has to go for initial ranging again. If 
the attacker continuously sets the RNG-RSP status as failed, 
it (M.S) access the network. This leads to the DoS attack. 
This RNG-RSP vulnerability is solved by Diffie-Hellman 
(D-H) key agreement [2], which is discussed in the later part 
of this thesis. 
b) Auth-Request and Invalid vulnerability 
In Auth-Request and Invalid vulnerability, the intruder 
captures the Auth-Request message and re-sends it to B.S 
continuously [4]. So the B.S is confused with the continuous 
request and sets the Auth-Response as failure. Some time 
the attacker may captures Auth-Response message from B.S 
and re-sends to M.S [5]. This issue can be solved by either 
introducing time stamps model. By adding time stamp, B.S 
and M.S identifies if the authorization message is proper. So 
the attacker unable to modify the messages. 
 
P a g e  |38 Vol. 10 Issue 13 (Ver. 1.0) October 2010 Global Journal of Computer Science and Technology 
 
 
 
c) Rogue BS 
For rogue BS attack, the M.S cannot verify that any 
authorization protocol messages it receives were generated 
by an authorized B.S. So any rogue BS can create a response 
[4]. To solve this issue, the M.S has to authenticate to the 
B.S. 
5) Denial of Service attack: 
DoS attacks such as unprotected network entry, unprotected 
management frame, weak key sharing mechanism in 
multicast and broadcast operations, unencrypted 
management communication and reset-command message 
[5]. Some DoS attacks are include the following: 
a) DoS attacks based on Ranging Request/Response 
(RNG-REG/RNG-RSP) messages 
An intruder can forge a RNG-RSP message to minimize the 
power level of M.S to make M.S hardly transmit to B.S, thus 
triggering initial ranging procedure repeatedly [4]. An 
intruder can also perform a water torture DoS by 
maximizing the power level of M.S, effectively draining the 
M.S‘s battery [5]. 
b) DoS attacks based on Mobile Neighbor Advertisement 
(MOB_NBR_ADV) message 
 
This message is sent from serving B.S to publicize the 
characteristics of neighbor base stations to M.Ss searching 
for possible handovers [4]. This message is not 
authenticated and it can be forged by an attacker in order to 
prevent the M.Ss from efficient handovers downgrading the 
performance or even denying the legitimate service [5]. 
c) DoS attacks based on Fast Power Control (FPC) 
message 
This message is sent from B.S to ask a M.S to adjust its 
transmission power [4]. This is also one of the management 
messages which are unprotected. An intruder can intercept 
and use FPC message to prevent a M.S from correctly 
adjusting transmission power and communicating with the 
B.S. He can also use this message to perform a water torture 
DoS attack to drainthe M.S‘s battery [5]. 
d) DoS attacks based on Authorization-invalid (Auth-
invalid) message 
The Auth-invalid is sent from a B.S to a M.S when 
Authorization key(AK) shared between B.S and M.S expires 
or B.S is unable to verify the CMAC/HMAC properly [4]. 
This message is unprotected by HMAC and it has PKM 
identifier equal to zero [4]. Thus, it can be used as DoS tool 
to invalidate legitimate M.S. 
e) DoS attacks based on Reset Command (RES-CMD) 
message 
 
This message is sent to request a M.S to reinitialize its MAC 
state machine, it allow a B.S to reset a non-responsive or 
malfunction M.S [4]. This message is protected by HMAC 
but is still potential to be used to perform a DoS attacks [5]. 
To prevent DoS attacks, first need to fix the vulnerabilities 
in the initial network entry & secure authentication 
technique. 
III. SOLUTION SUGGESTED 
1) Time stamp model for secure Authentication 
Time stamping (T.S) is the process of securely keeping track 
of the creation and modification time of a document. Here 
Security means that no one — not even the owner of the 
document should be able to change it once it has been 
recorded provided that the timestamper's integrity is never 
compromised. This technique is based on digital signatures 
and hash functions. First a hash is calculated from the data. 
A hash is a sort of digital fingerprint of the original data: a 
string of bits that is different for each set of data. If the 
original data is changed then this will result a different hash 
value. Anyone trusting the timestamper can then verify that 
the document was not created after the date that the 
timestamper vouches. It can also no longer be repudiated 
that the requester of the timestamp was in possession of the 
original data at the time given by the timestamp. Steps are 
given bellow: 
1. M.S sends communication request to B.S. 
2. B.S generates the hash (H1) of the data & sends it to the 
M.S. 
3. M.S now adds the T.S with H1 & generates hash H2.Then 
H2 is encrypted with the private key of M.S. Now send 
encrypted 
H2 & T.S of M.S to B.S. 
4. Now B.S has to add its data with the T.S of M.S & 
generate hash H3.Now decrypt H2 (Which was encrypted by 
private key of M.S) by the public key of M.S. If H3=H2 
then continue further communication, otherwise cease the 
communication immediately. This model can also apply to 
eliminate the possibility 
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of Man-In-The-Middle attack.
 
 
Figure 5: Secure Authentication process by using Time 
Stamp model 
2) DH- Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement 
It is a key agreement algorithm which helps M.S & B.S to 
agree on a shared secret between them without the need to 
exchange any secret/private information [13]. The DH 
standard is specified RFC 2631[6]. 
a) Key agreement Algorithm 
 
To establishing shared secret between M.S & B.S, both must 
agrees on public constants p and g. Where p is a prime 
number and g is the generator less than p. 
Step: 1 Let x and y be the private keys of M.S and B.S 
respectively, Private keys are random number less than p. 
Step: 2 Let gx mod p and gy mod p be the public keys of 
devices M.S and B.S respectively 
Step: 3 M.S and B.S exchanged their public keys. 
Step: 4 The end M.S computes (gy mod p)x mod p which is 
equal to gyx mod p. 
Step: 5 The end B.S computes (gx mod p)y mod p which is 
equal to gxy mod p. 
Step: 6 Since K = gyx mod p=gxy mod p, shared secret = K. 
b) Mathematical Explanation- DH 
From the properties of modular arithmetic, 
x mod n * y mod n ≡ x * y (mod n) 
We can write; 
(x1 mod n)*(x2 mod n)*… *(xk mod n) ≡ x1 * x2 * …* xk 
(mod n), 
if xi=x, where i = 1, 2, 3… k (x mod n)k ≡ xk mod n , (gx 
mod p)y mod p = gxy mod p and (gy mod p)x mod p = gyx 
mod p, For all integers gxy=gyx, Therefore shared secret 
K=gxy 
mod p=gyx mod p. 
Since it is practically impossible to find the private key x or 
y from the public key [7] gx mod p or gy mod p, it is 
impossible to obtain the shared secret K for a attacker . 
c) One-Way function in DH 
For M.S, Let x be the private key and a = gx mod p is the 
public key, Here, a = gx mod p is one-way function. The 
public key a is obtained easily in the forward operation, but 
finding ‗x‘ given a, g and p is the reverse operation and it 
will take exponentially longer time and is practically 
impossible. This is called discrete logarithm problem [7] . 
3) ECDH – Elliptic curve Diffie Hellman 
ECDH- a variant of DH, is a key agreement algorithm. To 
generate a shared secret between M.S and B.S using ECDH 
[14] [16], both have to agree up on Elliptic Curve domain 
parameters. An overview of ECDH is given below. 
a) Key Agreement Algorithm 
Establishing a shared secret between M.S and B.S 
Step 1: Let dX and dY be the private key of M.S and B.S 
respectively, Private keys are random number which is less 
than n, where n is a domain parameter. 
Step 2: Let QX = dX*G and QY = dY*G be the public key 
of M.S and B.S respectively, G is a domain parameter 
Step 3: M.S and B.S exchanged their public keys 
Step 4: The end M.S computes K = (aK, bK) = dX*QY 
Step 5: The end B.S computes L = (aL, bL) = dY*QX 
Step 6: Since K=L, shared secret is aK 
b) Mathematical Explanation (ECDH) 
To prove the agreed shared secret K and L at M.S and B.S 
K = dX*QY = dX*(dY*G) = (dY*dX)*G = dY*(dX*G) = 
dY*QX = L, Hence K = L, therefore aK = aL Since it is 
practically not possible to find the private key dX or dY 
from the public key QX or QY, it is impossible to obtain the 
shared secret for a third party [15] [16]. 
4) RSA 
It is a public key algorithm which is used for Encryption, 
Signature and Key Agreement. It (RSA) typically uses keys 
of size 1024 to 2048 [7]. The RSA standard is specified as 
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RFC 3447, RSA cryptography Specifications Version 2.1 
[17][3] . Overviews of RSA algorithms are given below. 
a) Parameter generation 
 
Step 1:Consider two prime numbers a and b. 
Step 2: Find n=a*b, Where n is the modulus which is made 
public. The length of n is considered as the RSA key length. 
Step 3: Choose a random number ‗e‘ as a public key in the 
range 0<e<(a-1)(b-1) such that gcd(e,(a-1)(b-1))=1. 
Step 4: Find private key d such that ed≡1(mod (a-1)(b-1)). 
Encryption 
Consider that B.S needs to send a message to M.S securely. 
Step 5:. Let e be M.S‘s public key. Since e is public, B.S 
has access to e. 
Step 6: To encrypt the message M, represent the message as 
an integer in the range 0<M<n. 
Step 7: Cipher text C = Me mod n, where n is the modulus. 
Decryption 
Step 8: Let C be the cipher text received from B.S. 
Step 9: Calculate Message M = Cd mod n, where d is M.S‘s 
private key and n is the modulus. 
b) Key Agreement (RSA)  
Public key cryptography involves mathematical operation 
on large numbers and these algorithms are considerably 
slow compared to the symmetric key algorithm [7] [17]. 
They are so slow that it is unable to encrypt large amount of 
data. Public key encryption algorithm such as RSA can be 
used to encrypt small data such as keys which used in 
private key algorithm [7]. RSA is thus used as key 
agreement algorithm. 
Key agreement algorithm: 
Establishing shared secret between B.S and M.S 
Step 10: Generate a random number, key to B.S. 
Step 11: Encrypt by RSA encryption algorithm using M.S‘s 
public key and pass the cipher text to M.S. 
Step 12: M.S decrypt the cipher text using M.S‘s private 
key to obtain the key. 
c) One-Way function in RSA 
Consider key generation equation Step 4, ed≡1(mod(a-1)(b-
1)) and n=a*b ,Where e is the public key d is the private 
key. a and b are kept private but n is made public. Since e is 
public, anybody who has access to a and b could easily 
generate the private key d using the above equation in Step 
4. The security of RSA depends on the difficulty to factorize 
n to obtain the prime numbers a and b [17] [7]. n is easily 
obtained by multiplying a and b but the reverse operation of 
factorizing n to obtain prime numbers a and b is practically 
impossible if a and b are large numbers.  
 
Figure: 6. Encryption Process by using Key, Generated by 
Public Key Algorithm. 
 
This encryption will be symmetric key encryption process & 
and it is suggested to use ‗Vernam Cipher‘ encryption 
process rather than DES or AES to encrypt initial 
management communication. Where key will be used as a 
random number for encryption .Because of the use of 
symmetric key encryption as well as Vernam Cipher which 
required only to performed bitwise Exclusive-OR operation, 
it will not introduce any traffic overhead in the network. 
Encryption process is described in figure 6 
5) Shared keys in Multi- and Broadcast Service 
  
Secure encryption of the data transferred via the MBS is 
very Difficult. A shared key cannot be used because every 
group member can forge messages when having the current 
symmetric keys [8]. But what can be avoided is the 
distribution of forged key update command messages 
allowing an attacker to take control over the data content on 
a M.Bs connection [8]. By using modular arithmetic we can 
solve this. We can generate GTEKs (Group Traffic 
Encryption Key) as part of a one way DH chaining function. 
But in one way DH function we can say that there is no 
inverse function or it is almost impossible to derive the 
inverse. B.S first generates a random number as initial key 
GTEK0 and other GTEKs are generated by applying a one 
way DH function to the previous GTEKs respectively. This 
is iterated n times.  
GTEK0 = random () 
GTEK1 = f (GTEK0) 
GTEK2 = f (GTEK1) 
 
GTEKn = f (GTEKn-1) 
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Figure 7: Avoiding Key forgery by generating GTEK as a 
part of a one way chaining function 
 
This DH chain function is used to verify each GTEK by 
applying the same one way function to the previous one. To 
achieve this chained authentication the last GTEK has to be 
distributed to each MS in a secure way as it is the only key 
in the chain which cannot be authenticated by another one 
[8]. To distribute GTEKn in the GKEK update command 
message is a unicast message and encrypted by a M.S 
related key. M.S can verify the integrity of new GTEK by 
applying the one way DH function to it [8]. If this 
authentication is positive, the current GTEK can be 
overwritten and the received one is established. If the 
authentication fails, the MS discards the message and 
requests a new GTEK [8]. To apply this algorithm, the key 
GKEK update command message must be capable of 
transporting GKEK and GTEK keys together [8]. Design of 
the key update command message already includes both 
keys so only a little modification is necessary here. 
Additionally, the GTEK state machine at B.S must generate 
the GTEK DH chain and store all the keys. The GTEK state 
machine at M.S must add the functionality to authenticate 
GTEK keys by calculating the DH function and comparing 
it to the previous key [8]. 
IV. OUTCOMES 
Approaches Existing System After applying 
the proposed 
solution 
Unauthenticated 
messages 
Exist Eliminated 
Management 
massages 
Unencrypted Encrypted 
DoS attack Possibility High Possibility Low 
Shared key  Vulnerable Secure 
Eavesdropping  High Low 
Masquerading 
M.S: Identity theft 
B.S: Rogue station 
Possible Not Possible 
Initial network 
entry 
Vulnerable Secure 
V. CONCLUSION 
Security mechanism is an expensive process; it requires 
extensive level of research, performance evolution & 
implementation outcomes. The IEEE 802.16e open the door 
for wireless mobility, vulnerability as well, because there 
are be no constraints for an attacker. In such a situation, 
more issues like, B.S to M.S key management, roaming user 
authentication & voice migration arise. IEEE 802.16 has the 
capability to attain success in wireless communication 
arena. But this technology is still under development and 
need more academic research and time to achieve a maturity 
level. 
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